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Reverse Contributors? African State Parties, ICSID, and the Development of International 
Investment Law 
 
Olabisi D. Akinkugbe* 
 
Abstract 
International investment disputes involving African states before the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) have generated significant critical inquiry.  
Yet, accounts of their contribution to the development of international investment law as 
a result of these dispute are limited. This article addresses this gap. It examines the 
contribution of some of the high-profile ICSID disputes involving African states to the 
development of international investment law. Notwithstanding the charges against 
African States in ICSID, I contend that the involvement of African States in ICSID 
Disputes has contributed to the development of international investment law. In 
particular, the jurisprudence that these ICSID case law has generated, not only affirm 
principles of international investment law, but more importantly, have opened new paths 




Foreign direct investment is a critical component of the external source of finance for many 
developing countries.1 The mechanisms for the settlement of disputes between multinational or 
transnational corporations (as investors) and the states have been contentious.2 In the context of 
                                               
* Assistant Professor, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University, Halifax, N.S., Canada. Ph.D., (University of 
Ottawa); LLM (University of Toronto), LLB (Hons) (University of Lagos, Nigeria), email: 
Olabisi.akinkugbe@dal.ca. I thank Professor Makane Moïse Mbengue for the invitation to contribute to this ICSID-
Review special issue on Africa and the ICSID System. Thanks also to the anonymous peer-reviewers and to Prof. 
James Thuo Gathii for their helpful feedback. The usual caveats apply. 
1 According to UNCTAD, “FDI [Foreign Direct Investment] inflows to Africa are forecast to increase by about 20 
per cent in 2018, to $50 billion. The projection is underpinned by the expectation of a continued modest recovery in 
commodity prices, and by macroeconomic fundamentals. In addition, advances in interregional cooperation, through 
the signing of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) could encourage stronger FDI flows in 2018. Yet 
Africa’s commodity dependence will cause FDI to remain cyclical.”  UNCTAD World Investment Report 2018, 
“Investment and New Industrial Policies”, online: https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2018_en.pdf; Olabisi 
D. Akinkugbe and Sara Seck, “2017 Developments in Home and Host State Policy Responses to Foreign Direct 
Investment”, in Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2017, Lisa E. Sachs, Lise J. Johnson, and Jesse 
Coleman (eds.), (Oxford University Press), pp. 49-64 
 At the continental level, international investment regime in Africa and the settlement of investment disputes 
is at a unique cross-road. There are regimes at the regional and national levels for the protection of foreign direct 
investment. Most recently is contentious debate on the ‘Africanization’ of international investment law as 
championed by the Pan-African Investment Code. See, Makane Moïse Mbengue and Stefanie Schacherer, “The 
‘Africanization’ of International Investment Law: The Pan-African Investment Code and the Reform of the 
International Investment Regime”, (2017) 18:3 The Journal of World Investment & Trade, pp. 414-448; Erik 
Denters and Tarcisio Gazzini, “The Role of African Regional Organizations in the Promotion and Protection of 
Foreign Investment” (2017) 18:3 The Journal of World Investment & Trade, pp. 449-492. 
 For an alternative argument, see, Won Kidane, “Contemporary International Investment Law Trends and 
Africa’s Dilemmas in the Draft Pan-African Investment Code”, (2018) Vol. 50 The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev., pp. 
523-579. (Arguing that Africa confronts significant ‘dilemmas’ with the Code once situated in the context of 
historical, extant and developing trends in international investment law. In Kidane’s view, “the code does not 
resolve Africa’s dilemmas; it merely codifies them.”) 
2 Leon E. Trakman, “The ICSID Under Siege”, (2012) Vo. 45 Cornell International Law Journal, pp. 604-663. 
(Evaluating the criticisms leveled at the ICSID and contending that “a contrite and diffident defense of the ICSID is 
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the resolution of investor-state disputes before the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), there are skeptics and optimists of the forum.3 ICSID’s paramount 
objective is to “promote a climate of mutual confidence between investors and states favourable 
to increasing the flow of resources to developing countries under reasonable conditions.”4 Now 
in its fifty-second year, in 2018, 57 new cases were registered and ICSID administered 279 – 
“the greatest number of cases ever administered in a single year.”5 19% of the disputes registered 
in 2018 under the ICSID Convention and additional facility rules by region involved sub-
Saharan African states.6 Between 1972 and 2017, African states have been a party to at least 144 
investor-state ICSID cases.7  
 
The participation of African state parties in ICSID administered investor-state disputes has been 
fierce and is far from settled.8 On the one hand, some scholars opine that African states were 
critical actors in the process that led to the establishment of ICSID and as such were conscious of 
the transformative potential of the ICSID system for the economic development of their 
economies.9 On the other hand, a different strand of scholarship that is more critical argues that 
colonial and post-colonial factors provide important context that illuminate the power asymmetry 
that were embedded in the establishment of ICSID. As such, they are less optimistic and perhaps 
more sceptical of the dispute mechanism and its claim to equality of parties among other factors. 
At the heart of these views emerges a murky narrative of the participation, and possibly 
                                                                                                                                                       
that its problems can be ascribed to the complexity of the multiple layers of investment law and that ICSID 
arbitration is one among multiple means of solving conflicts with real human, social and political potency. As such, 
it should not be construed as an end in itself.) 
3 M. Sornarajah, Resistance and Change in the International Law on Foreign Investment, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015); [*] 
4 Ibrahim T.I. Shihata, “Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and 
MIGA”, (1992: Washington DC, World Bank), 1-32, pp. 5-6 Online: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/335931468315286974/Towards-a-greater-depoliticization-of-
investment-disputes-the-roles-of-ICSID-and-MIGA   
5 ICSID, 2018 Annual Report, (Sept. 6, 2018) p. 11. This was a 16% increase over the number of cases registered in 
2017. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Paul-Jean Le Cannu, “Foundation and Innovation: The Participation of African States in the ICSID Dispute 
Resolution System”, (2018) ICSID Review, pp. 1-45, pp. 40-45 (List of ICSID Cases involving African State 
Parties); Won Kidane, “The China-Africa Factor in the Contemporary ICSID Legitimacy Debate” (2014) Vol. 35, 
No.3, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, pp. 560-604, pp. 624-673. 
8 Won Kidane argues that “When the World Bank asked the newly independent African states to join ICSID in 
1964, they were rather unsure of what it meant for them beyond the promise of increased foreign investment … 
Then, predictably, many African states appeared before ICSID tribunals over the years, accused of unlawful 
expropriation and denial of justice … With almost no participation in the decision-making process, … the African 
states continued to accept the “creditors’ interpretation” of the investment treaties with their wealthier and more 
powerful partners.” Won Kidane, “Contemporary International Investment Law Trends and Africa’s Dilemmas in 
the Draft Pan-African Investment Code”, (2018) Vol. 50 The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev., pp. 523-579, pp. 533-534. 
9 “… fifteen of the twenty instruments of ratification, the deposit of which brought the ICSID Convention into force, 
came from African States — Benin, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of the Congo, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, and Uganda (the 
other five came from Iceland, Jamaica, Malaysia, the Netherlands and the United States).” Judge Charles N. Brower 
and Michael P. Daly, “A Study of Foreign Investment Law in Africa: Opportunity Awaits”, online: 
<https://www.arbitration-
icca.org/media/7/82088225980224/brower__daly_a_study_of_foreign_investment_law_in_africa.pdf> pp. 4-10. 
(“Africa’s Historical Role Within Foreign Investment Law”) p. 5; AA Agyemang, “African states and ICSID 
arbitration”, (1988) Comp. & Int’l L.J. S. Afr., pp. 177 – 189, (examining “the extent of African utilization of ICSID 
for purposes of settling investment disputes and the factors which possibly account for such utilization or non-
utilization of the facilities of the Centre.”), p. 177. 
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contribution of African states to the development of international investment law on the one 
hand, and ICSID case law, on the other hand.  
 
Significant critical work has been done that focused on the marginality of African states in the 
evolution of international law and other international legal fields.10 Whereas theoretical 
approaches such as Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), and in the context 
of continental investment law, the ‘Africanization’ of international investment law thesis 
championed by Makane Mbengue, has attempted to reclaim some of Africa's role in this process, 
albeit not without its complexity, it is important to avoid critique that inadvertently perpetuates 
the ‘dilemmas’ – as Won Kidane conceptualizes – of the role of African states in the on-going 
development of international legal fields.  
 
Particularly, in the context of contentious ‘organic’ or non-organic evolution of international 
investment law, while African states may not have participated equally or at all in some of the 
institutions or organizations and the dispute settlement that demarcate the contours of 
international law and international investment law, this article argues that such analysis should 
not foreclose the possibility of accounting for subsequent contributions of African states to the 
development of the regimes, especially, in the post-colonial era. As a caveat, the case for 
conceptualizing African state parties as reverse contributors to the development of international 
investment law and ICSID case law should not be constructed as blind to the power relations that 
are embedded in the international legal structures that constrain African states. Similarly, this is 
not an argument for African exceptionalism as it may be possible to draw similar arguments in 
the context of other regions that comprise the Third World. Rather, while I acknowledge these 
challenges, this article contributes to the scholarly work that tease out African states' 
contribution, despite the murkiness of the critical debates.11 Put conversely, an analysis of the 
contribution of African states to the development of international investment law as undertaken 
in this article, does not undermine the on-going critique of the work of many scholars, rather, it 
strengthens it by illuminating nuanced implications that have arisen from the disputes involving 
African states.  
 
Based on the analysis of some high-profile investment disputes involving African states, I 
contend that the jurisprudence emerging from these disputes have contributed to the 
development, shaping, evolution, and contour mapping of international investment law. While I 
acknowledge the critique that African states have mostly been involved in the investment 
disputes as Respondents, I argue that this fact should not limit our analysis of the contribution 
that the issues decided upon by the Arbitral Tribunal have made to the development and 
evolution of international investment law. Being a respondent in a dispute is not synonymous 
                                               
10 Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development Economic Growth and the Politics of 
Universality, (Cambridge University Press, 2011); _________, “The Postcoloniality of International Law”, (2005) 
46:2 Harvard International Law Journal, pp. 459-469; Obiora Chinedu Okafor, “Critical Third World Approaches to 
International Law (TWAIL): Theory, Methodology, or Both?”, (2008) 10 International Community Law Review, 
pp. 371-378; ______, “Newness, Imperialism, and International Legal Reform in Our Time: A TWAIL 
Perspective”, (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall Law Journal, pp. 171-191.  
11 Paul-Jean Le Cannu, “Foundation and Innovation: The Participation of African States in the ICSID Dispute 
Resolution System”, (2018) ICSID Review, pp. 1-45; Ibironke Odumosu-Ayanu, “International Investment 
Arbitration and Corruption Claims: An Analysis of World Duty Free v. Kenya” (2011) 4 Law and Development 
Review Article 5; Tsotang Tsietsi, “International Commercial Arbitration: Case Study of the Experiences of African 
States in the international Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes”, (2013) 47 The International Lawyer, pp. 
249-271. 
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with being passive in the matter. At a time when international investment law is under a 
significant call for transformation, there is an opportunity to also reflect on the contribution of 
African states in investment related disputes before the ICSID Tribunal overtime. 
 
 
In Part I, I develop the thesis that high-profile investment disputes involving African states as 
respondents should be understood not simply for the substantive matters they resolve. Rather, by 
reconceptualizing the role of the African state respondents as reverse contributors to the 
jurisprudence that these disputes have produced, we are able to capture the value of these high-
profile cases to the evolution and development of international investment law overtime. High-
Profile international investment disputes involving African states are delineated by the fact that 
the substantive issues that the Tribunal issued awards or procedural orders on not only reinforce 
aspects of ICSID and international investment law rules, but they also clarify concepts and at 
other times deliberate on novel matters that no previous arbitral tribunal has ruled upon. In Part 
II, I analyze the contributions of these selected high-profile investment disputes involving 
African states by categorizing them into three (3) generations. The Frist-Generation of high-
profile cases map investment disputes that occurred from the late 1970s to 1990s; the Second-
Generation then starts from 2000s to 2010; while the Third-Generation is from 2010 to the 
present. It is important to note that the periodization adopted in this article is not static nor are 
they intended to be interpreted as linear. Rather, they are fluid and overlapping and have been 
marked by a definite period for the purpose of analyses of the disputes over the 50 years of 
ICSID that was recently celebrated. In the concluding section of the article, I contend that 
looking back, despite the challenges and backlash that African states have faced as Respondents 
in ICSID arbitral disputes, international investment disputes involving African States have not 
only contributed to the development of international investment law, but African states continue 
to be an important player today with even better prospects for the future given the growing wave 
of arbitral regulatory regimes in the continent as well as future investment opportunities that will 





African State Respondents as Reverse Contributors in ICSID Investment Disputes 
 
In the context of international law scholarship, the Euro-centric antecedents and the participation 
of developing countries and African states in particular have been analyzed with significant 
academic rigour in the studies on resistance movements, anti-colonialism, and even in post-
colonial African states.13 Similar questions loom with respect to the origins and evolution of 
                                               
12 Judge Charles N. Brower and Michael P. Daly, “A Study of Foreign Investment Law in Africa: Opportunity 
Awaits”, online: <https://www.arbitration-
icca.org/media/7/82088225980224/brower__daly_a_study_of_foreign_investment_law_in_africa.pdf> pp. 4-10. 
(“Africa’s Historical Role Within Foreign Investment Law”); Won Kidane, “Alternatives to Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement: An African Perspective”, Global Economic Governance Discussion Paper, January 2018 
13 See generally, Rajagopal Balakrishnan, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and 
Third World Resistance, (Cambridge University Press, 2003); James Thuo Gathii, “International Law and 
Eurocentricity” (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law, pp. 184-211; Anthony Anghie, “The Evolution of 
International Law: colonial and postcolonial realities”, (2006) Vol. 27, No. 5, Third World Quarterly, pp. 739-
753.(sketching a history of the relationship between imperialism and international law in the evolution of 
international law from the 16th century). 
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international investment law.14  From this perspective, the history of Africa’s ‘dilemmas’ as it 
relates to ICSID is intricately interwoven with the Eurocentric foundations of international 
investment law.15 For example, Won Kidane contends that “[t]he historical record clearly 
indicates that the only reason that the African states accepted ICSID is because they thought that 
they had to do so in order to attract private foreign investment to develop their ailing post-
colonial economies.”16 In this regard, the ratification of the ICSID Convention by African States 
not only has the potential for an enhanced flow of foreign investment but also, it affirms the 
sovereign status of African states in early post-colonial Africa.17 More recently, Kidane asserts 
further that: 
 
“International investment law [IIL] comes with a very old and lingering historical 
baggage that continues to engender doctrinal confusion and outright suspicion … IIL is 
not made by Africa, it was made for Africa as a replacement for colonial rules for the 
protection of capital.”18 
 
Kidane conceptualizes ICSID creation as part of a robust plan that Joost Pauwelyn alluded to in 
his description of programs that were constructed and strategies for investment protection that 
were meant to avoid the economic collapse of the 1930s. While Kidane argues that it will be 
difficult to sustain Pauwelyn’s claim that international investment law is “organic and 
incremental,”19 in probing Pauwelyn’s incrementality and organic thesis on the origin of 
international investment law, Kidane inevitably inserts the controversial debate around Africa’s 
role in the development of international law.20 A strand of the debate on the contribution of 
Africa to the development of international law centres around the role of African elites. The 
work of some of the African elite intellectuals that were involved in the development of the 
universal norms of public international law and by extension the negotiation, drafting and 
establishment of the ICSID Convention are critical.  
                                               
14 Zachary Douglas, Joost Pauwelyn, and Jorge E. Viñuales (eds.) The Foundations of International Investment Law: 
Bringing Theory into Practice, (2014: Oxford University Press); Georges Abi-Saab, “The third World intellectual in 
praxis: confrontation, participation, or operation behind enemy lines?” (2016) 37:11 Third World Quarterly, pp. 
1957-1971. 
15 Won Kidane, “Contemporary International Investment Law Trends and Africa’s Dilemmas in the Draft Pan-
African Investment Code”, pp. 528-534.  
16 Won Kidane, “Alternatives to Investor-State Dispute Settlement: An African Perspective”, Global Economic 
Governance Discussion Paper, January 2018; Won Kidane, “The China-Africa Factor in the Contemporary ICSID 
Legitimacy Debate”, (2014) 35 U. Penn. J. Int’l L. p. 559 at 585-86.) Daniel Behn, Tarald Berge & Malcolm 
Langford, “Poor States or Poor Governance: Explaining Outcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2018) 38:3 
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, pp. 335-382.  
17 Tsotang Tsietsi, “International Commercial Arbitration: Case Study of the Experiences of African States in the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes”, (2013) 47 The International Lawyer, pp. 249-271. 
(Questioning whether the membership of ICSID has necessarily resulted in increased investment flows). 
18 Won Kidane, “Contemporary International Investment Law Trends and Africa’s Dilemmas in the Draft Pan-
African Investment Code”, p. 526.  
19 Joost Pauwelyn, “Rational Design or Accidental Evolution? The Emergence of International Investment Law” in 
The Foundations of International Investment Law: Bringing Theory into Practice, Zachary Douglas, Joost 
Pauwelyn, and Jorge E. Viñuales (eds.) (2014: Oxford University Press), pp. 10-43 
20 For a more recent survey of these debates, see, James Thuo Gathii, “Africa and the History of International Law”, 
Albany Law School Research Paper No. 48 of 2011/2012, Dieng, Adama in Jeremy Levitt (ed.) Mapping New 
Boundaries in African International Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2008); M. W. Mutua, ‘(Book Review) Africa: 
Mapping New Boundaries in international Law by Jeremy I. Levitt’ (2010) 104 American Journal of International 
Law, pp. 532-538; Jeremy I. Levitt, “The African Origins of International Law: Myth or Reality? (2015) 19:113 
UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs, pp. 114-158. 
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One of these elites whose work has been significantly scrutinized is Taslim Olawale Elias.21 
Elias participated in the ICSID negotiation process as the Attorney-General of Nigeria. He later 
became a judge of the International Court of Justice.22 In heartily recommending the Preliminary 
Draft of the ICSID Convention, Elias described it as  
 
“an attempt not only to restore the confidence of the investor but also to codify certain 
principles of customary law and to engage in the progressive development of 
international law, and he warmly recommended it.”23  
 
James Gathii argues that Elias was innovative in his use of history to “reclaim or claim a place in 
international legal history for Africa” … “because Elias sought not to reject international law for 
its legacy and participation in the colonization of Africa, but rather sought to use these legal tools 
as best as he could to reform international law to serve the newly independent countries.”24 Elias’ 
support of ICSID came at a hopeful moment for Africa – right after decolonization  and although 
Africa was experiencing its first series of internal challenges, Elias did not abandon his faith in 
the transformative potential of international law and of foreign investment.25  
 
In relation to the praxis of international investment law, in his recent book, The Culture of 
International Arbitration, Kidane took on a “cultural critique of international arbitration.”26 
Drawing on his personal experiences from arbitral hearings, Kidane masterfully interrogates the 
cultural complexity that is embedded and are regularly confronted in the inner chambers of 
arbitral proceedings – many of which we do not get to hear because of the confidentiality of the 
process.27 In Kidane’s view, contemporary international arbitration as characterized by a 
diversified user base must account for these variations in process and practice. Reviewing this 
book, Makane Moïse Mbengue and Elise Ruggeri Abonnat aptly describe “Kidane’s analysis [a]s 
a legitimate reminder that the status quo is not an option as well as a prompt reminder … that 
                                               
21 James Thuo Gathii, “A Critical Appraisal of the International Legal Tradition of Taslim Olawale Elias”, (2008) 21 
Leiden Journal of International Law, pp. 317-349. The volume was dedicated to an examination of the works of 
leading international legal jurists.  
22 Elias T. Olawale, Africa and the Development of International Law, [1972] 
23 ICSID, History of the ICSID Convention: Documents Concerning the Origin and Formulation of the Convention 
(1968) Volume II-1, p. 244 
24 Gathii, “A Critical Appraisal of the International Legal Tradition of Taslim Olawale Elias”, p. 347. 
25 Yet, at the time Elias wrote, there were other contemporaries such as Julius Nyerere who were critical and less 
optimistic of the transformative potential of international (investment) law. See, Jeannette Hartmann, “Development 




26 Won L. Kidane, The Culture of International Arbitration, (2017: Cambridge University Press), p. 4. Also see 
generally, Tom Ginsburg, “The Culture of Arbitration”, (2003) 36 Vand. J. Int’L Law, p. 1335. 
27 For example, following a vivid explanation of one of the proceedings he was involved, he notes: 
“The problem – which is almost always framed in the context of the incompetence of the local 
representatives of the parties and witnesses who come from cultures outside of the cultures that dominate 
international arbitration – is almost never framed in the context of cultural competence of the tribunals to 
understand and serve the parties who selected them, or who make their selection possible, but, rather is 
framed as the cultural deficiency or incompetence of the parties or their representatives who appear before 
such tribunals.” Kidane, P. 6, Ibid. 
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“Not only must justice be done; it must also be seen to be done.””28 Despite the fact that African 
states’ participation in the status quo continues in “the same terrain of hegemonic international 
[investment] law,” the seeds for potential change and reforms that address the critiques of ICSID 
lie with the liberal promises of international investment law.29 
 
In this regard, other scholars such as Mark Fathi Massoud, have drawn attention to the intricate 
and mutuality of international arbitration and judicial politics in authoritarian states. Massoud 
argues that in the context of Sudan,  a commitment to arbitration is a signal to investors that their 
concerns are its priorities and that “parties to a contractual agreement choose arbitration because 
of its flexibility in an uncertain business climate…”30 According to Massoud, “authoritarian 
regimes, particularly those in politically fragile and resource-rich contexts, are agreeing to 
submit to international arbitration clauses in order to (1) promote investment or economic 
liberalization and (2) make promises to foreign investors that mitigate uncertainty in the event of 
a dispute.”31 Regardless of the view one holds of ICSID, and the backlash against investment and 
arbitration,32 It is instructive to note as Ibrahim Shihata and Sergio Puig have stated that “ICSID 
should not be assessed solely on the basis of effects as an international adjudicatory body.”33  
 
With the foregoing in mind, I now turn to the elaboration of the concept of African parties as 
reverse contributors. The participation of African states was critical to the establishment of 
ICSID. As Paul-Jean Le Cannu observes, “the distinctive role that African states played in 
shaping the nascent ICSID system set the stage for their continued contribution to its 
evolution.”34 Similarly, A.A. Agyemang declares that “judging from [the] role of African states 
in ICSID institutions … African states ought to call [ICSID] their own and have confidence in to 
settle their investment disputes”35 However, beyond their role in the establishment of ICSID, 
African states have been important actors in the development of ICSID jurisprudence. As at 
December 2017, African states has been involved as a party in over 140 disputes. Deriving from 
this high level of participation in disputes, I argue that the jurisprudence that emerges from these 
                                               
28 For a review of Kidane’s book, Makane Moïse Mbengue and Elise Ruggeri Abonnat, (2017) Ethiopian Yearbook 
of International Law, 221-225, p. 225. 
29 Gathii, James Thuo, “The Agenda of Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL)” (December 20, 
2018). Forthcoming in Jeffrey Dunoff and Mark Pollack (eds) International Legal Theory: Foundations and 
Frontiers, Cambridge University Press (2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3304767, pp. 1-45, p. 
41. 
30 Mark Fathi Massoud, “International Arbitration and Judicial Politics in Authoritarian States”, (2014) 39:1, Law & 
Social Inquiry, pp. 1-30 
31 Ibid, pp. 22-23. 
32 Georges Abi-Saab, “The Third World intellectual in praxis: confrontation, participation, or operation behind 
enemy lines?” (2016) 37:11 Third World Quarterly, pp. 1957-1971. 
33 Sergio Puig, “Recasting ICSID’s Legitimacy Debate – Towards a Goal-Based Empirical Agenda”, (2013) 36:2 
Fordham International Law Journal, pp. 466-504, p. 469. Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, “Towards a Greater Depoliticization 
of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and MIGA”, (1986) 1:1 ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law 
Journal, pp. 1-25; “ICSID should not be solely regarded as a mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes … 
ICSID must be regarded as an instrument of international policy for the promotion of investments and of economic 
development.” pp. 5-6 
34 Cannu, “Foundation and Innovation: The Participation of African States in the ICSID Dispute Resolution 
System”, supra note 7, p. 3; Karel Daele, “Africa’s Track Record in ICSID Proceedings”, Kluwer Arbitration Blog 
(30 May 2012), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2012/05/30/africas-track-record-in-icsid-proceedings/, 
(accessed 27 October, 2018); Judge Charles N. Brower and Michael P. Daly, “A Study of Foreign Investment Law 
in Africa: Opportunity Awaits”, supra note 3;  Won Kidane, “The China-Africa Factor in the Contemporary ICSID 
Legitimacy Debate”, (2014) 35 U. Penn. J. Int’l L. p. 559 at 599.   
35 A.A. Agyemang, p. 183. 
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disputes has not only advanced substantive concepts in international investment law, but also 
clarified aspects of the discipline while simultaneously contributing to the development of ICSID 
case law and procedures. 
 
As reverse contributors the focus is two-fold: (i) the fact that they are mostly respondent parties; 
and, (ii) the type of arguments that they have raised and the opportunity it has provided for the 
development of ICSID case law and by extension, the field of international investment law. 
Reverse contributors therefore denote the fact that while these states may not have been the 
claimants, their role as respondents who were actively involved in the cases, and in particular, 
the arguments they advanced and the reports of the tribunal in affirming or rejecting them, have 
advanced our understanding of international investment law rules and concepts. In other words, 
the primary focus is not on the fact that the arguments proffered by the states through their 
counsel have been adopted by the tribunal. Rather, it is in the overall outcome effect it has had 
for an elaboration of concepts and the provisions of the investment agreements out of which the 
dispute has arisen.  
 
Reverse contributors as conceptualized in this article does not preclude critique nor does it signal 
at cooptation. To use Georges Abi-Saab’s description, it also does not exclude ‘operations 
behind enemy lines.’36 In other words, while reform of the ICSID system is an on-going process, 
African states continue to be involved in disputes, hence, it is important to account for the role or 
value they add to the system simultaneously with the process of exposing the defects of the 
system. In this regard, African state parties are reverse contributors precisely because of the 
historical and contemporary complexity, power relations and rules of the game that discipline 
their involvement in ICSID arbitrations. As reverse contributors, they are not wedded to global 
capital lock, stock and barrel.  
 
As reverse contributors in the substantive development of international investment principles, 
their push-back at different stages, strategies of defence, and willingness to not just accept the 
position of the investors or transnational corporations provided a rich opportunity overtime for 
the elaboration of the ICSID rules on various issues in international investment law while also 
pushing the boundaries to new areas.37 While a case-by-case country defence strategy is beyond 
the scope of this article38, there is a considerably  wide array and complex permutations of the 
background factors that drive the approach of the various African states that have been involved 
in ICSID arbitration.39 As will become evident from the analyses of some high-profile ICSID 
cases in the next section, African countries engagement with ICSID and the consequential 
elaboration of ICSID rules have consistently grown over the first fifty years of ICSID – as the 
saying goes, it takes two to tango!  
 
                                               
36 Georges Abi-Saab, “The Third World intellectual in praxis: confrontation, participation, or operation behind 
enemy lines?” (2016) 37:11 Third World Quarterly, pp. 1957-1971, 1964. 
37 Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa Chung & Claire Balchin (eds), The Backlash Against 
Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality, (Hague: Kluwer Law, 2010) 
38 Julia Calvert, “State Strategies for the Defence of Domestic Interest in investor-State Arbitration”, International 
Institute for Sustainable Development, February 29, 2016. Online: https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/02/29/state-
strategies-for-the-defence-of-domestic-interests-in-investor-state-arbitration-julia-calvert/  
39 Langford, M., Behn, D., & Fauchald, O. “Backlash and State Strategies in International Investment Law” in T. 
Aalberts & T. Gammeltoft-Hansen (Eds.), The Changing Practices of International Law, pp. 70-102. (2018: 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
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Viewed from this perspective, African states, as reverse contributors to ICSID jurisprudence and 
case law, are indeed shapers of the ICSID policy development, beyond the critical role they 
played in the establishment of the system. In Part II, I examine some of the high-profile disputes 
involving African states in respect of which consequential rulings have been delivered by the 





Generations of Disputes involving African States over the International Investment Years 
 
As of December 31 2017, African states have been involved in one hundred and seventy one 
(171) cases before the ICSID Tribunal.40  The transnational economic relations between post-
colonial African states and investor industrialized corporations have generated a significant 
amount of investment related disputes. The analysis of some of the investment disputes involving 
African countries is undertaken in the ensuing sections under three generations. The 
periodization of the three generations is overlapping and should not be viewed as linear. The type 
of disputes  the parties bring also reveal the on-going change and expansion in the development 
of international investment law to areas and issues outside of core foreign investment protection 
and expropriation.  
 
First Generation: 1970s – 1990s 
 
The First Generation of cases are the earliest engagement of African Sates with the ICSID 
system.41 These disputes were fundamental in the early stages of ICSID as they underpinned 
ICSID’s future development. It is indeed reflective of the reverse contributor status of African 
states described in this article that the first dispute before ICSID,42 the first case where an award 
was rendered where a state was the claimant,43 and the first successful counter-claim,44 involved 
different African states.45 In this regard, the high-profile disputes that I will discuss include 
Holiday Inns S.A. & Others v. Morocco;46 Societe Ltd. Benvenuti et Bonfat Srl (Italy) v. The 
Government of Congo47; The Pyramids Case48; and the Klockner v. Cameroon disputes.49  
 
The Holiday Inns S.A. & Others v. Morocco (Holiday Inns) dispute popularly dubbed as the first 
‘World Bank’ arbitration had Morocco as a Respondent.50 Registered in 1972, it was the first 
request for arbitration under the ICSID Convention. Following initial negotiation between 
                                               
40 For a list of all these cases, see, Cannu, supra note 7, pages 40-45.  
41 Lynch, “The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes: Selected Case Studies” (1981-1983) 
7 International Trade Law Journal, p. 306. 
42 Holiday Inns S.A. & Others v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/72/1 (1972). 
43 Adriano Gardella SpA v. Cote d’Ivoire, ICSID Case No. ARB/74/1, Award rendered in 1977. 
44 Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4 
45 Gabon v Societe Serete SA, ICSID Case No. ARB/76/1. 
46 Holiday Inns S.A. & Others v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/72/1 (1972).  
47 Societe Ltd. Benvenuti et Bonfat Srl (Italy) v. The Government of Congo,  
48 Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3. Online: 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C135/DC671_En_old.pdf  
49 ICSID Case No. ARB/81/2.  
50 Pierre Lalive, “The First ‘World Bank’ Arbitration (Holiday Inns v. Morocco): Some Legal Problems”, (1980) 
51:1 British Yearbook of International Law, pp. 123-162. The article also provides a very useful account of the facts 
of the dispute. 
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representatives of the parties to the dispute regarding boosting the tourism industry in Morocco 
via the construction of hotels, the parties entered into a ‘basic agreement’ joint venture with the 
objective of establishing and operating in Morocco four Holiday Inn hotels of 300 rooms each, 
namely in Rabat, Marrakesh, Fez and Tangiers. As part of its obligations, the Moroccan 
government undertook to provide loans and incentives to the investors towards the completion of 
the project. For business related and tax decisions, the investors opted to create a separate 
affiliated company: Holiday Inns S.A. Glarus, and Occidental Hotels of Morocco. As at when the 
parties signed the basic agreement for the project, Holiday Inn S.A. Glarus, was in the process of 
being incorporated while Occidental Hotels of Morocco had in fact not been established. The 
Agreement between the parties provided for ICSID arbitration in the event of a dispute. Despite 
progress in the construction of the hotels, there was trouble between the parties in relation to the 
financing as the Moroccan government not only stopped the payment they were required to 
make, but also refused to proceed with the incentives it had promised. Based on the foregoing, 
the Claimant commenced the ICSID arbitration. For various reasons, Morocco objected to ICSID 
jurisdiction.51 Amongst other things, Holiday Inns dispute therefore raised the question: when is 
a contracting state party bound by the ICSID arbitration system? As well as what it means to be 
treated as the “national of another Contracting State” for the purpose of Article 25(2)(b) of the 
ICSID Convention.52 The tribunal rejected Morocco’s arguments holding that the dispute came 
under the ambit of the Convention based on the agreement of the parties. According to the 
Tribunal, it is of the opinion that the ICSID Convention allows parties to “subordinate the entry 
into force of an arbitration clause to the subsequent fulfillment of certain conditions, such as the 
adherence of the States concerned to the Convention, or the incorporation of a company 
envisaged under the agreement.”53 The tribunal, however, agreed with the government of 
Morocco that the  chain of hotels being built did not come under the umbrella of “national of 
another Contracting State.”54  
 
If the Holiday Inn dispute indicated the circumstances when a national judiciary will not be 
seized of jurisdiction when parties have agreed to arbitration, Societe Ltd. Benvenuti et Bonfat Srl 
(Italy) v. The Government of Congo provides another early investment dispute involving African 
state before the ICSID where the clarification of the jurisdiction and applicability of the ICSID 
arbitration system vis-à-vis the potential role of a local court is examined.55 The dispute arose out 
of a joint venture between the claimant Italian firm and the Government of the People’s Republic 
of Congo for the establishment of a local company. The local company named PLASCO will 
manufacture plastic bottles for mineral water and the ownership structure is divided into 60% 
and 40% stakes respectively for the government and the investor. As part of its obligations, the 
government was not only required to pay a certain percentage of the company’s share capital, but 
also, guarantee the financing of the new company, grant preferential tax status among other 
measures aimed at protecting the company; while the investor will in addition to contributing its 
                                               
51 For example, “Morocco argued that the parties lacked the capacity to agree to ICSID arbitration because, at the 
date of the 1966 basic agreement, neither Morocco nor Switzerland was a party to the ICSID Convention… 
Furthermore, the company itself was not yet a legal entity under Swiss law.” W. Michael Tupman, “Case Studies in 
the Jurisdiction of the international Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes”, (1986) 35:4 The International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, pp. 813-838, p. 818. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Continuing, the Tribunal noted that “On this assumption, it is the date when these conditions are definitely 
satisfied, as regards one of the involved, which constitutes in the sense of the Convention the date of consent by that 
party.” Ibid, p. 818. 
54 Ibid, p. 819. 
55 Ibid, p. 823. 
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own share capital, operate the plan and guarantee the marketing of the bottles produced.56 As 
events unfolded, the government of Congo not only failed to meet its obligations under the 
agreement and even after the investor stepped in to mitigate the situation, but also frustrated any 
possibility of fruition from the mitigation by the investor. Eventually, the government disposed 
PLASCO of the plant and its company offices. The agreement provided that dispute arising will 
be settled under the ICSID arbitration. When the investor commenced arbitration under the 
ICSID rules, the government of Congo contended the Centre’s jurisdiction on the grounds that 
there was a requirement for the exhaustion of local judicial remedies by the investor prior to the 
ICSID proceedings57, and that the doctrine of lis pendens required that the action must in any 
case be suspended because of a criminal proceeding against a representative of the investor. 
While the ICSID Tribunal did not make any pronouncement on the question of exhaustion of 
remedies before the judiciary; the Tribunal rejected the lis pendens contention by the government 
of Congo as the identity of the parties and the subject matter of dispute were different. While the 
priority accorded to ICSID arbitration in terms of exclusivity has been reinforced, this dispute 
nevertheless provided as insight into the circumstances where the pendency of an action before a 
national court may have impact on an ICSID proceeding. 
 
The Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt (Pyramids 
Case)58 dispute provides another illustration of the significance of the jurisprudence that involves 
African states. Although the award in this case was made in 1992, the case had begun since the 
1980s, hence, I categorize it as part of the First-Generation disputes. The case is particularly 
worthy of note because for the first time, an ICSID Tribunal upheld its jurisdiction based on the 
Egyptian law. As for the facts, in 1974, Southern Pacific Properties (SPP), entered into 
agreements with Egypt to establish a joint venture with a view to developing an international 
tourist complex at the Pyramids Oasis in Egypt. SPP’s Egyptian subsidiary, SPP(ME), held 60% 
of shares in joint venture company, with the remaining 40% owned by the Egyptian partner. The 
project went ahead until 1978 when, as a result of parliamentary opposition, the Government 
effectively cancelled the project placing the joint venture company in judicial trusteeship. In 
1984, the Claimants decided to take the matter before an ICSID Tribunal, pursuant to Egyptian 
Law which contained an ICSID arbitration provision. The Claimants maintained that Egypt’s 
actions violated the agreements and amounted to expropriation of the investment, and thus 
claimed compensation for the value of their investment in the joint venture company plus 
interest. In upholding Egypt’s actions as a lawful expropriation of the Claimants’ investment, the 
Tribunal assumed jurisdiction by placing reliance on Egyptian and international law. The 
significance of this case has been analyzed by scholars.59   
 
Further in the context of First-Generation investment disputes involving Africa states that has 
contributed to the development of international investment law is the case of Klockner v. 
                                               
56  Ibid. 
57 Summarizing the relevant provisions of the agreement between the parties, Tupman, stated that “Article 25 of the 
PLASCO by-laws provided that any dispute between the shareholders concerning corporate matters, or between the 
shareholders and the company, “which have not been settled either by the competent courts of the corporate 
jurisdiction or, by negotiation, shall be arbitrated under the [ICSID] Convention.” Ibid, p. 824. 
58 W. Laurence Craig, “The Final Chapter in the Pyramids Case: Discounting an ICSID Award for Annulment 
Risk”, (1993) 8:2 ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal, pp. 264-293. 
59 For example, see, Jan Paulson, “Arbitration without Privity”, (1995) 10:2 ICSID Review – Foreign Investment 
Law Journal, pp. 232-257.  
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Cameroon.60 Klockner is historic in the sense that it was the first investment dispute that 
provided an avenue for an arbitral decision on the concept of annulment. In this regard, the case 
carries on the theme of clarifying and affirming ICSID rules on annulment, which, in the context 
of ICSID arbitration, is a remedy of an extraordinary nature in the sense that ICSID awards are 
final and binding on the parties to the dispute.61 Annulment is one of the hand-full of post-award 
remedies available under the ICSID Convention as an exceptional recourse to safeguard against 
the violation of fundamental legal principles relating to the process.62  
 
Klockner, a German company, and two subsidiaries of Klockner instituted an arbitration 
proceeding against Cameroon and the Societe Camerounaise des Engrais under the ICSID 
proceeding. The arbitration which commenced in 1981 ended in 1983 with an arbitral award and 
a dissenting opinion.63 A year later, Klockner sought to have the award annulled under the 
provisions of Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. In 1985, an ad hoc Committee that was 
established pursuant to the provisions of Article 52(3) of the ICSID Convention annulled the 
award. The implication of the annulment was that the dispute was re-submitted to ICSID 
arbitration. Despite the criticism that the annulment proceedings drew, particularly with respect 
to exceeding their jurisdiction by re-examining the merits of the case and obscuring the lines 
between an appeal and annulment64, the case demonstrates the contribution of African states as 
parties to investment disputes before the ICSID. 
 
In addition to the foregoing, an African state – the Democratic Republic of Congo – was the first 
to file an application for revision of an award in 198865 and so was the first conciliation 
proceedings under the Convention.66 An important fact that derives from the examination of 
some of the First-Generation cases is that African states have simply carried on the momentum 
as far as their engagement with the ICSID regime is concerned. They are indeed primary users of 
the system and the First-Generation of disputes involving African state parties have been crucial 
to the development of the first two decades of ICSID dispute system.  
 
Second-Generation: 2000s - 2010 
 
In this section, I move the analyses forward by examining a different the set of cases involving 
African states as parties from the 2000s. By way of overview, this category of disputes not only 
                                               
60 Another dispute involving an African State that is relevant and illustrative of the jurisprudence on partial 
annulment in ICSID, is Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, Dec. 22, 1989, 4 
ICSID Rep. (1997).  
61 Christoph Schreuer, “Three Generations of ICSID Annulment Proceedings”, [*], pp. 17-42;  
62 Article 52(1) provides that “Either party may request annulment of the award by an application in writing 
addressed to the Secretary-General on one or more of the following grounds:  
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; 
(c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of  
the Tribunal; (d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) that 
the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based.” 
63 For a useful summary of the case and dissenting opinion, see, Jan Paulsson, “The ICSID Klockner v. Cameroon 
Award: the Duties of Partners in North-South Economic Development Agreements”, (1984) 1 Journal of 
International Arbitration, 145; Friedrich Nigggemann, “The ICSID Klockner v. Cameroon Award: the Dissenting 
Opinion,” (1984) 1 Journal of International Arbitration, 331. 
64 Mark B. Feldman, “The Annulment Proceedings and the Finality of ICSID Arbitral Awards, (1987) 2 ICSID 
Review Foreign Investment Law Journal 85.  
65 American Manufacturing & Trading, Inc v. Democratic Republic of Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1. 
66 SEDITEX v. Madagascar, ICSID Case No CONC/82/1 
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clarify rules such as those relating to amicus curiae and certain standards of treatment of 
investments, but also, they reinforce the rule of law as an instrument against corruption in 
foreign investment relations, expropriation, clarification of the concept of “investment”67, 
procedural matters going to transparency of international investment arbitration, and broader 
societal concerns beyond pure investment focus. For example, in the 2005 case of Wena Hotels 
Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, the first application for interpretation was filed.68 Similarly,  
in the case of BSG Resources Limited (in administration), BSG Resources (Guinea) Limited and 
BSG Resources (Guinea) SARL v. Republic of Guinea, for the first time, parties agreed to apply 
the 2014 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration in an 
ICSID arbitration.69 In the remaining section of the Second-Generation, I will focus on Salini 
Costruttori SpA and Italstrade SpA v. Kingdom of Morocco;70 World Duty Free v. Kenya;71 
Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. United Republic of Tanzania72 as disputes involving 
African States and exemplifying their contribution to the development of international 
investment law.  
 
The Salini v Morocco dispute provides a unique and original addition to the list of cases with 
African parties as respondents which yielded a consequential award – this time in relation to the 
test for the determination of “investment.” The ICSID Convention did not define the notion of 
“investment.”73 The dispute arose from an agreement entered into in 1994 between the Claimants 
and the Kingdom of Morocco for the construction of part of a highway connecting different 
regions in Morocco. The construction work was undertaken by the Claimants and duly 
completed in 1999. It was their effort to recover claims for compensation that had been refused 
by relevant agencies of the Kingdom of Morocco that led to this dispute. In 2000, the Claimants 
submitted a request on the basis of the ICSID arbitration clause in the bilateral investment treaty 
between the government of Italy and the Kingdom of Morocco. In response, the Moroccan 
government raised a number of objections. They contended that the Tribunal lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction as a contract for the construction of a highway could not be characterized as 
an investment but as contract for services. In addition, they argued that Tribunal did not have 
ratione personae jurisdiction.74 In its decision on the meaning of “investment”, the Tribunal 
provided four-way criteria75 that has been critically engaged in the literature as not mandatory.76 
Upon applying the test, the Tribunal found that the construction work engaged in by the 
Claimant could not qualify as an investment within the meaning of Article 25 of the Washington 
Convention.  
 
                                               
67 For example, see, American Manufacturing and Trading (AMT) v. République du Zaïre, [*] 
68 ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4 
69 ICSID Case No. ARB/14/22 
70 ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4 
71 ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7. The Metal-Tech Ltd v the Republic of Uzbekistan falls into this category as well. 
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award of 4 October 2013 
72 ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22 
73 Julian Davis Mortenson, “The Meaning of “Investment”: ICSID’s Travuax and the Domain of International 
Investment Law”, (2010) 51:1 Harvard Journal of International Law, pp. 257-318 
74 Emmanuel Gaillard and Yas Banifatemi, “Introductory Note to ICSID: Salini Contruttori SPA and Italstrade SPA 
v. Kingdom of Morocco (Proceeding on Jurisdiction)”, (2003) 42:3 International Legal Materials, pp. 606-608. 
75 Drawing on a mix of the activity in question in this case and scholarly writings, the Tribunal developed the 
following criteria: the existence of contributions; a certain duration in the performance of the contract; participation 
in the risks of the transaction; the transaction contributes to the economic development of the host state. 
76 Alex Grabowski, “The Definition of Investment under the ICSID Convention: A Defense of Salini”, (2014) 15:1 
Chicago Journal of international Law, pp. 289-308. 
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Another important case in the Second-Generation that has generated significant analyses in the 
context of ICSID jurisprudence is the World Duty Free v Kenya. Prior to discussing the case, it is 
important to provide a brief context of corruption and anti-corruption, particularly as it relates to 
developing countries of the African continent.77 Foreign direct investment and economic 
development, especially in developing countries, are two sides of the same coin that have 
implications for economic growth. While corruption remains an important scourge across the 
African continent, in the majority of known cases of major corruption in African States, there is 
an international dimension or party that is also involved. In the context of foreign investment 
contracts, allegations of corruption in the procurement process remains an important obstacle to 
the realization of the maximum economic and social development in African states. In reality, 
the multinational and transnational corporations that are involved in the bribery for the award of 
the contracts and projects have hardly been held accountable.78   
 
Bearing the foregoing in mind, the World Duty Free v. Kenya, is refreshing in its deployment of 
the ICSID arbitration for the pursuit of rule of law and anti-corruption in foreign investment. In 
1989, Kenya concluded an agreement for the construction, maintenance, and operation of duty-
free complexes at its Nairobi and Mombassa International Airports—with a company called the 
“House of Perfume” (incorporated under the laws of the Isle of Man, United Kingdom). In June 
2000, an Isle of Man corporation, World Duty Free Company Ltd, launched arbitral proceedings 
against the Republic of Kenya under the ICSID convention. It did so pursuant to an arbitration 
clause in a contract by which World Duty Free had been awarded the exclusive concession to run 
the duty-free operations at Kenya’s international airports in Nairobi and Mombassa.79 As part of 
its case, the Claimant adduced evidence to the effect that the contract was procured after the 
payment of bribe. However, they contended that they were “gifts” which were cultural in Kenya 
and had in fact been legitimized when the government accepted them.80 On their part, the 
government of Kenya did not join issues with the Claimant on this point. Rather, they asked for 
an immediate dismissal of the claims on the ground that they were contrary to public policy, 
                                               
77 Odumosu, Ibironke T. "International Investment Arbitration and Corruption Claims: An Analysis of World Duty 
Free v. Kenya," (2011) 4:3 The Law and Development Review, pp. 88-129; Tamar Meshel, “The Use and Misuse of 
the Corruption Defence in International Investment Arbitration”, (2013) 30 J. INT’L ARB. 267; Margareta Habazin, 
“Investor Corruption as a Defense Strategy of Host States in International Investment Arbitration: Investors’ Corrupt 
Acts Give an Unfair Advantage to Host States in Investment Arbitration”, (2017) 18:805 Cardozo Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, pp 805-828. 
78 For literature that discusses the intertwined nature of corruption and foreign direct investment, see, Mohsin Habib 
and Leon Zurawicki, “Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment”, (2002) 33:2 Journal of International Business 
Studies, pp. 291-307;  
79 For an account of the facts and insights of this case by the counsel on record for the Republic of Kenya, see, 
Constantine Partasides, World Duty Free v. The Republic of Kenya: a Unique Precedent, Chatham House 
International Law Discussion Group, 28 March 2007. Online: https://star.worldbank.org/corruption-
cases/sites/corruption-cases/files/documents/arw/Moi_World_Duty_Free_Chatham_House_Mar_28_2007.pdf; 
Travis Edwards, “Corruption as a Jurisdictional Barrier in Investment Arbitration: Consequences and Solutions” The 
Global Anticorruption Blog, July 17, 2007. Online: https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/tag/world-duty-free-v-
kenya/  
80 The Claimant’s counsel built there case of three arguments in contending that it should not be dismissed: “(i) First 
we were told that “gifts” of this kind are customary practice and culturally sanctioned in Kenya, and thus could 
involve no illegality; (ii) Secondly, as this “gift” had been paid to the head of state, the personification of the state, 
the state itself had received the payment, and had relevant knowledge of the payment, and had therefore affirmed the 
contract – even if there had been any earlier illegality; and (iii) thirdly and finally, the Claimant asked the Tribunal 
to “accept” the “messy realities of international business in the 1970s and 1980s in the developing word”, and to 
“balance the venality” of the “giving” and “taking” of a bribe so as not to punish the payer to the advantage of the 
“receiver”” Ibid, pp. 3-4. 
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unenforceable and that the “machinery of international justice was not available to enforce the 
fruit” of illegality.81 The decision of the Tribunal was rendered six years later by a panel of three 
Arbitrators that the contract which was the basis of the dispute by the Claimant had been 
procured based on the payment of bribe to the then Kenyan Head of State – President Daniel 
arap Moi. Premised on this fact, the claims of the Claimant were dismissed in their entirety as 
one that is contrary to international public policy and therefore unenforceable. An interesting fact 
that the World Duty Free adds to the jurisprudence of ICSID Tribunal relates to the power of an 
arbitrator, even in cases where parties have not raised illegality, to suo moto address such public 
policy issue and not feel constrained to its brief as derived from the agreement of the parties to 
the dispute. Further, the case stands as the first of its kind in ICSID where a matter was struck 
out by an Arbitral Tribunal on non-jurisdictional basis.82  
 
Furthermore, the case Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. United Republic of Tanzania, 
provides a rich example of investment dispute involving an African state with consequential 
tribunal awards – substantive and procedural – beyond the case itself. In this regard, the dispute 
raises issues relating to sustainable development, expropriation in the context of foreign 
investment, transparency in and legitimacy of investor-state dispute settlement, consideration of 
broader societal concerns relating to environmental health and water.83 The case also adds to the 
jurisprudence of the ICSID on the definition of “investment” under the ICSID Convention as 
well as amicus curiae participation in international investment disputes. In addition, for the first 
time, a deliberation and order were issued by a Tribunal on the question of disclosure of arbitral 
proceedings thereby contributing to the debate for greater transparency in international 
investment arbitration.84 
 
The World Bank provided Tanzania some funding for the repair, upgrade, and expansion of the 
water and sewage infrastructure of the city of Dar es Salaam.85 A condition of the funding was 
that the United Republic of Tanzania will appoint a private company for the purposes of 
managing and operating the infrastructure improvements. The Claimant - Biwater Gauff 
(Tanzania) Limited, a private water company – emerged as the preferred bidder for the 
management of the infrastructure improvements. BGT is a joint venture created by Biwater 
International Limited and HP Gauff Ingenieure GmbH & Co. for the purposes of the Tanzanian 
project; Biwater owns 80% of BGT and Gauff owns 20%. The Claimant subsequently entered 
into agreements with various Tanzanian subcontractors as part of the conditions of its contract. 
Three years into the implementation of the project – May 2005, the Tanzanian government and 
the Dar es Salaam Water and Sewage Authority terminated the contract of one of the 
subcontractors and proceeded to expropriate its assets.86 In its claim before the ICSID Tribunal 
                                               
81 Ibid, p. 3. 
82 Danielle Young, “Is Corruption an Emerging Cause of Action in Investor-State Arbitration?”, The Global 
Anticorruption Blog, January 22, 2016. Online: https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2016/01/22/is-corruption-an-
emerging-cause-of-action-in-investor-state-arbitration-2/  
83 Frances Aldson, “Biwater v. Tanzania: do corporations have human rights and sustainable development 
obligations stemming from private sector involvement in natural resource provision?” (2010) 2 Environmental 
Liability, pp. 58-66.  
84 Katia Fach Gómez, “Rethinking the Role of Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: How to Draw 
the Line Favourably for the Public Interest”, (2012) 35:2 Fordham International Law Journal, pp. 513-524;  
85 World Bank, “Tanzania – Dar es Salaam Water Supply and Sanitation Project”, Report No. PID7578, 4 February 
2003, online: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/216391468778537045/pdf/multi0page.pdf;  
86 John Vidal, “Flagship water privatization fails in Tanzania”, The Guardian, 25, May 2005, 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/may/25/uk.world  
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in August 2005, the Claimant (being partly British and German company) argued that the 
Tanzanian government had breached the terms of a 1994 bilateral investment treaty between the 
United Kingdom and Tanzania for the Promotion and Protection of Investments and was also in 
violation of the provisions of the Tanzanian Investment Act. On its part, the Tanzanian 
government contended that the Citywater contract was terminated because it did not have 
sufficient funds to execute the project with such significant implications for public health and 
welfare. Hence, it was left with no option than to expropriate the project in the interest of the 
public. In the ICSID proceeding, amicus briefs were received from Tanzanian and international 
non-governmental organizations in support of the Tanzanian Government.87 For the NGOs, they 
argued that investor responsibilities in the sustainable development and human rights contexts88 
extend to specific issues such as duty to apply proper standards and due diligence procedures, the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda, duty of good faith, and a duty to abide by the investor’s general 
responsibilities. 
 
Refusing the Republic of Tanzania’s argument, the Tribunal ruled in favour of the Claimant that 
the actions of the Tanzanian government amounted to an expropriation of the Claimant’s 
investment under the bilateral investment treaty. In particular, the tribunal ruled that the Republic 
of Tanzania had not acted in a fair and equitable manner in engaging in unreasonable and 
discriminatory conduct for informing the public of the termination of the contract when in fact it 
had not done so. However, the Tribunal did not award any monetary compensation to the 
Claimant as there was no value ascribed to the company as at the time of expropriation.89 
 
First, the dispute adds to the ICSID jurisprudence on the clarification of the concept of 
“investment.” Article 25 of the ICSID Convention provides that ICSID Tribunals can only 
assume jurisdiction over certain legal disputes. In this regard, a jurisdictional requirement is that 
the dispute in question must have been borne directly out of an “investment” – a term that is not 
defined in the ICSID Convention. The United Republic of Tanzania had argued that meaning of 
“investment” under the ICSID Convention has now been determined by the case law and 
required the establishment of the “Salini” test.90 The Tribunal, however, rejected the argument of 
the Tanzanian government on the ground that the application of the Salini test to define 
“investment” is not mandatory or static as they are merely factors that should be taken into 
account. In defining “investment”, the critical point of reference that should inform the meaning 
                                               
87 The amicus curiae brief filed by The Lawyers’ Environmental Action Team; The Legal and Human Rights Centre; 
The Tanzania Gender Networking Programme; The Center for International Environmental Law; and The 
International Institute for Sustainable Development is available online: 
https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/investment_amicus_final_march_2007.pdf. “The brief argues that BGT’s acts and 
omissions caused its investment to fail and that investors in the water sector have a heightened level of responsibility 
because the success of a business venture in this area has a direct impact on the achievement of an essential human 
right - the right to clean and safe water.  The brief further argues that taking into consideration human rights and 
sustainable development, termination of the contract by a government, if done in good faith to prevent the worsening 
or abuse of human rights, should not be found to be a contractual breach, especially when a contract’s purpose was 
to promote and enhance the achievement of such rights.” Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, “Biwater-
Tanzania arbitration”, online: https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/biwater-tanzania-arbitration. 
88 Graham Mayeda, “Sustainable International Investment Agreements: Challenges and Solutions or Developing 
Countries” M. Gehring, M.-C. Cordonier Segger & A. Newcombe (Eds.), Sustainable development in world 
investment law, (2011, Kluwer Law International), p.  535. 
89 Expropriation claims remains a contentious aspect of the Tribunal awards and the Third-Generation cases 
involving Zimbabwe sheds some more light on this aspect of ICSID tribunal jurisprudence. 
90 This requires the establishment of a 5-stage test: (1) adequate duration; (2) regularity of profit and return; (3) risk; 
(4) substantial commitment of resources, financial or otherwise; and (5) contribution to the host state’s development. 
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ascribed is the relevant bilateral investment treaty. Indeed, rather than the narrow and strict 
approach in Phoenix v Czech Republic91, the Tribunal adopted a broad approach to defining 
“investment.”  
 
Second, the dispute provided an important procedural clarification on the participation of amicus 
curiae in international investment arbitration under the ICSID Arbitration Rules. It should in fact 
be noted that although it was not necessarily a direct consequence of the final outcome of the 
case, that the Arbitration Rules were amended to clarify that tribunals are empowered to allow 
submissions by amicus curiae and provide guidelines for their intervention is an important 
development from this case.92  That the amici in this case were allowed to intervene was a result 
of this revision which has become part of the international investment jurisprudence. The 
Claimant’s contention that the interventions by amici will not be relevant was accordingly 
rejected by the Tribunal. The significance of the Tribunal’s acceptance of and copious references 
to the amici contributions are further significant in that “it recognizes and affirms the public 
interest in investor-state disputes, helps normalize the idea of non-party participation, helps 
ensure that investor-state disputes take into account broader issues such as sustainable 
development and human rights where relevant, promotes investor and government accountability 
and enhances the perceived legitimacy of the system.”93 
 
Third, in addition to the substantive issues dealt with in this case, there is also a significant 
procedural contribution from the dispute.94 One of the questions that the Tribunal adopted 
Procedural Order No. 3 to deal with was the unilateral decision by the United Republic of 
Tanzania to disclose certain documents relating to the proceeding in the public realm. The 
Tribunal also addressed for the first time the issue regarding the publication of documents during 
the arbitral proceedings in detail. As Christina Knahr argues, the Order is noteworthy for two 
reasons: “first, the tribunal’s thoroughly weighing of transparency against procedural integrity 
and non-aggravation of the dispute; and second, its separate examination of various kinds of 
documents produced during the proceedings with respect to their suitability for publication.” 95 
Indeed, the order of the Tribunal is a “valuable contribution to increasing clarity on how to 
address the issue of publication of documents in arbitral proceedings” and “the novelty of the 
order lies in the differential treatment of various kinds of documents produced by the parties as 
well as the tribunal in the course of the proceedings and the tribunal’s distinct conclusions 




                                               
91 ICISD Case No. ARB/06/5. 
92 N. Bernasconi-Osterwalder, “Transparency and amicus curiae in ICSID arbitration: Lessons learned from Biwater 
Gauff v. Tanzania,” in M. Gehring, M.-C. Cordonier Segger & A. Newcombe (Eds.), Sustainable development in 
world investment law, (2011, Kluwer Law International), p. 189. 
93 Lise Johnson, Commentary on “Biwater v. Tanzania”, International Institute for Sustainable Development, 
October 18, 2018. Online: https://www.iisd.org/itn/2018/10/18/biwater-v-tanzania/  
94 Fiona Marshall, “The Precarious State of Sunshine: Case Comment on Procedural Orders in the Biwater Gauff 
(Tanzania) Ltd. v. Tanzania Investor-State Arbitration”, (2007) McGill Journal of Sustainable Development Law, 
3:2 pp. 181-203 
95 Christina Knahr, “Introductory Note to International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID): 
Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd.  v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No. 
3 (2007) 46:1 International Legal Materials, pp. 12-14, p. 12.  
96 Ibid, p. 13. 
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Third-Generation: 2010 – to Date 
 
The Third-Generation of investment disputes involving African states start from 2010 to the 
present moment. Like the previous generations, the Third-Generation disputes represent a 
significant and radical extension of the frontiers of issues in ICSID investment disputes 
jurisprudence. This category of investment disputes interestingly incorporates new themes such 
as – sustainable development, human rights, protection of indigenous rights and environmental 
standards to mention a few – in the broader discourse on international investment. Although 
human rights concerns have not traditionally been included in international investment treaties, 
human rights and indigenous peoples’ rights where the dispute relates to land will remain critical 
in the debate on the future of investment arbitration as the Second and Third Generation of 
investment disputes involving African countries show.97  
 
For the purpose of this article, I will focus on the following disputes: Menzies Middles East and 
Africa SA and Aviation Handling Services International Ltd. v. Republic of Senegal;98 and 
Bernhard von Pezold and others v. Zimbabwe.99 These disputes challenge the systemic 
integration between international investment law and other areas of the law. They have also 
opened new vista with respect to broader developments in Africa, new models of investment 
agreements and even the use of remedies such as restitution which is scarcely ordered in ICSID 
arbitration.  
 
The dispute in Bernhard von Pezold and others v. Zimbabwe100 arose from complaints of 
expropriation without compensation by the Government of Zimbabwe of large agricultural estate 
belonging to the claimants. The claimants allege that they have been unfairly targeted as part of 
Zimbabwe’s land reform process that had begun since the 1980s. Bernhard von Pezold and his 
family, who are dual Swiss and German nationals, bought 78,275 hectares of farmland in 
Zimbabwe starting in 1988 under the Switzerland–Zimbabwe and Germany–Zimbabwe bilateral 
investment treaties.101 Following an amendment to the constitution of Zimbabwe in 2005, the 
Zimbabwean state acquired title to most of the claimants’ land, revoked their right to challenge 
the acquisition, and criminalized their continued occupancy of the land. While Zimbabwe 
admitted the allegation of expropriation, they contended that it had been done for the purposes of 
                                               
97 Silvia Steininger, “What’s Human Rights Got To Do With It? An Empirical Analysis of Human Rights 
References in Investment Arbitration” (2018) 31 Leiden Journal of International Law, pp. 33-58, p. 34; P. 
Muchlinski, ‘Holistic Approaches to Development and International Investment Law: The Role of International 
Investment Agreements’, in J. Faundez and C. Tan (eds.), International Economic Law, Globalization and 
Developing Countries (2010), 180  
98 ICSID Case No. ARB/15/21 
99 ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15. Other cases involving African states in this generation that have either affirmed 
principles of international investment law or added to the ICSID jurisprudence in other notable ways include: 
Millicom International Operations B.V. and Sentel GSM SA v. The Republic of Senegal, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/20; Helnan International Hotels A/S v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19; International 
Quantum Resources Limited, Frontier SPRL and Compagnie Miniere de Sakania SPRL v. Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/21.  
100 J. Cameron Mowatt and Celeste Mowatt, “Boarder Timbers and Others v. Zimbabwe and von Pezold and Others 
v. Zimbabwe”, (2013) 28:1 ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal, pp. 33-44.   
101 Jacob Greenberg, “ICSID tribunal orders Zimbabwe to return expropriated farms”, May 16, 2016, International 
Institute for Sustainable Development, online: https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/05/16/icsid-tribunal-orders-zimbabwe-
to-return-expropriated-farms-bernhard-von-pezold-and-others-v-zimbabwe-icsid-case-no-arb-10-15-jacob-
greenberg/  
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transferring the land to indigenous Zimbabweans. Further amendments to Zimbabwe’s 
constitution in 2013 provide full compensation for land seized from “indigenous Zimbabweans” 
and reaffirmed the right of foreign investors to full compensation under the bilateral investment 
treaties.102 
 
With respect to the expropriation claim, the Tribunal rejected Zimbabwe’s argument that the 
estate was lawfully acquired for public purpose and to compensate for the historically 
disadvantaged indigenous people of Zimbabwe. In ruling in favor of the Claimant, the Tribunal 
found Zimbabwean government’s expropriation of the estate of the Claimant as unlawful, 
without compensation, racially discriminatory, and a violation of the bilateral investment treaties 
Zimbabwe signed with Germany and Switzerland. The tribunal also found that the actions of the 
Zimbabwean government violated fair and equitable treatment provisions of the bilateral 
investment treaties. The remedy order for the violations was also unconventional. The tribunal 
ordered restitution as an appropriate and feasible remedy for the purposes of this case. 
 
The dispute also enriches the growing jurisprudence of ICSID on amici curiae and interventions 
by NGOs on the basis of human rights violations. In Bernhard von Pezold and others v. 
Zimbabwe, the European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) and several 
Zimbabwean indigenous communities sought permission to be join as amici curiae in the arbitral 
proceedings. The ECCHR had sought to join because of the involvement of European investors. 
ECCHR, together with the indigenous chiefs, sought to draw the tribunal's attention to the fact 
that these properties are located on the ancestral territories of the native peoples. On this issue, 
the Tribunal rejected the request to participate as amici curiae on the grounds that: (i) the amici 
had not demonstrated that their submission would assist the tribunal in determining a factual or 
legal issue related to the proceedings, address a matter within the scope of the dispute, or would 
flow from any significant interest they had in the proceeding103; and (ii) that the amici were not 
independent from Zimbabwe. Luca Bastin argues that the Tribunal created an extra layer of 
burden for would-be amici curiae by requiring an appearance of or “apparent independence” of 
the amicus into the provisions of ICSID Arbitration Rule 37.104 The decision of the tribunal has 
also been described as conservative compared to other instances where ICSID tribunal allowed 
the intervention of NGOs in previous cases on the basis of the human rights law. 
 
Another ICSID case in the current dispensation that involved an African state as Respondent and 
illustrated the overlap, though divergent, of principles of Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) in 
international trade law via-s-vis international investment law is Menzies Middles East and Africa 
SA and Aviation Handling Services International Ltd. v. Republic of Senegal.105 In the context of 
this case, ICSID tribunal upheld Senegal’s objection to jurisdiction and dismissed the 
applicability of MFN clause provision in World Trade Organization (WTO) General Agreement 
in Trade and Services (GATS) as a way to find that Senegal consented to ICSID international 
arbitration.  In 2003, the claimants acquired Aviation Handling Services SA (AHS SA). The 
company was created under Senegalese law for the purpose of ground handling activities in 
                                               
102 Zimbabwe’s Constitution of 2013, online: http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/zim127325.pdf; James Tsabora, 
“Reflections on the Constitutional Revolution of Property and Land Rights under the 2013 Zimbabwean 
Constitution”, (2016) 60:2 Journal of African Law, pp. 213-229. 
103 That is a straight application of the rules for joining amicus curiae under ICSID Arbitration Rule 37(2). 
104 Lucas Bastin, “Amici Curiae in Investor-State Arbitrations: Two Recent Decisions”, (2013) Australian 
International Law Journal, pp. 95-104. 
105 Rebecca Hekman, Nadege Huart and Janet Whittaker, “Menzies Middle East and Africa S.A. and Aviation 
Handling Services International Ltd. v. Republic of Senegal”, (2017) 16:1 World Trade Review, pp. 143-147. 
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Senegalese airports. Problem ensued for the company when its activities was temporarily 
suspended based national investigations relating to illicit enrichment and collusion in illicit 
enrichment under Senegalese local laws. When AHS SA’s Senegalese principals were eventually 
found guilty and the assets of the company confiscated, the claimants sued before ICSID 
contending the illegality of the actions of the Senegalese government under general international 
law and bilateral investment treaties with Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Senegal’s 
objections to jurisdiction were three-fold: that Senegal did not consent to arbitration; that there 
was no investment made in Senegal by the claimants; and also disputed the Senegalese 
nationality of the claimants. The claimants relied on provisions of the WTO GATS, Senegalese 
investment code, bilateral investment treaties between Senegal and Netherlands on the one hand, 
and Senegal and the United Kingdom on the other hand. In refusing the claimant’s argument, the 
tribunal found that the GATS does not provide the basis for consent to arbitration in any form 
and could not be the basis for imputing an unequivocal consent to Senegal.106 According to the 
tribunal, the decision to not uphold its obligations under GATS is an exercise of the Senegalese 
government’s sovereign prerogative, the breach of which appropriate dispute mechanism is 
provided for under GATS. 
 
Based on the forgoing analyses, an undeniable and important narrative emerges regarding the 
contribution of international investment disputes involving African States to the development of 
the international investment law regime: ICSID arbitration rulings involving African states have 
been critical to the development of international investment law.107 These disputes have provided 
a significant opportunity for the elaboration of ICSID Convention Arbitration Rules, the 
relationship of international investment law to other areas of the law such as human rights law, 
international trade law and public international law broadly conceived. Specifically, from 
clarifications regarding the notion of an investment, standards of treatment, standards of 
protection – expropriation, procedural aspects relating to admissibility, remedies, national 
investment laws, transparency before the ICSID with consequential actions leading to the 
amendment of ICSID Arbitration Rules, and corruption to mention a few, African states, mostly 





Concluding Remarks – Entrenching Africa’s Contribution to ICSID 
 
The primary aim of this article was to provide an account of the contributions of African states to 
the development of international investment law over the years based on their participation in 
ICSID disputes. Despite the questions regarding the status of the ‘equality’ regarding their 
involvement, African states’ participation, both numerical and consent contexts, were critical to 
the establishment of ICSID. In the operational phase of ICSID, the analysis of the participation 
of African states in ICSID, particularly as parties to disputes has drawn significant critical 
reflection that draw attention to the power relations embedded in the system, apparent lack of 
                                               
106 For a brief summary of the decision, see, Suzy H. Nikièma, “ICSID tribunal dismisses MFN clause in WTO 
GATS as a means of importing Senegal’s consent to arbitration from third party BIT”, December 12, 2016, 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, online: https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/12/12/mfn-clause-wto-
gats-importing-consent-arbitration-third-party-bit-menzies-middle-east-africa-aviation-handling-services-
international-senegal/  
107 Cannu’s recent article provides a fascinating empirical analysis of various sectors that the disputes have emerged. 
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diversity108 in the calibre, gender, and geographical pool of ICSID arbitrators, and cultural 
differences. The article acknowledges that these critiques are well-founded and will need to be 
addressed. 
 
While the project for the reform of ICSID109 and entrenchment of the participation of African 
states, and African arbitrators in ICSID arbitration continues, the article made the point that we 
must also reclaim the various contributions that the participation of African states in ICSID 
dispute has made to the overall development of ICSID case law and international investment 
law. In this regard, the article conceptualizes African states as reverse contributors – a concept 
that was adopted and analyzed precisely to demonstrate the complexity of the historical and 
extant context of the participation of African States in ICSID. The concept does not distinguish 
between the law firms as counsel and the states in the sense of originator of the arguments. It is 
deliberately broad to indicate the mutuality of the relationship in that regard and to capture the 
fact that the states have their narratives that provide the factual basis for the arguments by the 
arbitrators, quite distinctly from the legal and technical aspects.  
 
To interrogate the reverse contributions, the article examined analyzed some disputes involving 
African states over three generations that are overlapping and not linear. The First Generation of 
cases are the earliest engagement of African Sates with the ICSID system. These disputes were 
provided the earlier opportunities for arbitrators to clarify concepts and the applicability of 
ICSID rules and procedures. The Second Generation of disputes were critical not only to clarify 
rules such as those relating to amicus curiae and certain standards of treatment of investments, 
but also, they reinforce the rule of law as an instrument against corruption in foreign investment 
relations, expropriation, clarification of the concept of “investment”, procedural matters going to 
transparency of international investment arbitration, and broader societal concerns beyond pure 
investment focus. The Third Generation of disputes analyzed in the article represent a significant 
and radical extension of the frontiers of issues in ICSID investment disputes jurisprudence. This 
category of investment disputes interestingly incorporates new themes such as – sustainable 
development, human rights, protection of indigenous rights and environmental standards to 
mention a few – in the broader discourse on international investment. Although human rights 
concerns have not traditionally been included in international investment treaties, the article 
notes that human rights, sustainability and indigenous peoples’ rights concerns, particularly as 
they are implicated in the disputes involving African States, will remain critical in the debate on 
the future of investment arbitration. 
  
Looking forward, foreign direct investment in African states is far from its point of 
maximization. As new opportunities emerge for investment and transnational companies invest 
                                               
108 For an account of the effort ICSID is making to promote diversity, see, Meg Kinnear, “Advancing diversity in 
international dispute settlement”, The World Bank Blog, March 8, 2019: Online: 
https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/advancing-diversity-international-dispute-settlement 
109 For current efforts aimed at reforms in the ICSID rules and procedure, see, the ICSID Secretariat’s recently 
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ICSID, “ICSID Rues and Regulations Amendment Process”, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/amendments.  
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suggest that ICSID engage more with Arbitrators from Africa to build their input in this process. There are many top 
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in the economic development of African states, the ICSID Arbitration system will continue to be 
an important forum for the settlement of investment disputes given the comfort they afford to the 
investors. The natural implication of the continuing recourse to the ICSID system is that 
opportunities for the development of new jurisprudence that address new areas of investment 
opportunities will arise. One hopes that narrative regarding the participation of African states, as 
parties to ICSID dispute will consolidate in even more substantive ways to the development of 
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